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Abstract 
 
The actual (classical) Brain-Computer Interface attempts to use brain signals to drive suitable 
actuators performing the actions corresponding to subject's intention. However this goal is not fully 
reached, and when BCI works, it does only in particular situations. The reason of this unsatisfactory 
result is that intention cannot be conceived simply as a set of classical input-output relationships. It 
is therefore necessary to resort to quantum theory, allowing the occurrence of stable coherence 
phenomena, in turn underlying high-level mental processes such as intentions and strategies. More 
precisely, within the context of a dissipative Quantum Field Theory of brain operation it is possible 
to introduce generalized coherent states associated, within the framework of logic, to the assertions 
of a quantum metalanguage. The latter controls the quantum-mechanical computing corresponding 
to standard mental operation. It thus become possible to conceive a Quantum Cyborg in which a 
human mind controls, through a quantum metalanguage, the operation of an artificial quantum 
computer. 
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1. Introduction 
The Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCI) are systems that acquire and analyze brain signals (typically 
of electromagnetic nature) to create high-bandwidth communication channels in real time between 
the human brain and a computer (see for an overview, e.g., Dornhege et al., 2007). Most often BCI 
are designed to capture subject’s intentions in order to drive suitable actuators, performing the 
actions wanted by the subject himself. However, even if BCI seem to open the way for a deep 
merging between human minds and computers, their actual implementations still appear as 
unsatisfying and very far from reaching the goal of a complete integration between human beings 
and artificial devices.  
In this paper we will introduce some arguments supporting the impossibility of reaching this goal 
within the design framework actually used for BCI. In short, this impossibility is due to the fact that 
actual BCI are designed to allow a computer-to-computer communication within a classical context. 
However, recent studies lead to the conclusion that the human mind is not a classical computer, and, 
in general, not completely reducible to any kind of computer (not even classical) because of the 
non-algorithmic nature of some mental processes. Moreover, we will argue that most mental 
processes should be described by Quantum Physics. Among these processes there are control 
processes acting on most mental operations which, otherwise, could not be performed. As control 
processes can be seen as a sort of metathought, the logic underlying them can be viewed as the one 
of a (quantum) metalanguage describing most high-level mental processing, such as reasoning, 
decision making, recalling from memory, and  the like. A quantum metalanguage reflects into a 
quantum object language, and controls the latter. 
If we adopt this theoretical framework, it follows that, provided we have at disposal new kinds of 
BCI, allowing a quantum-computer-to-quantum-computer communication, we could use human 
mind to control, through its quantum metalanguage, the operation of an artificial quantum 
computer. The whole system constituted by a human subject and an artificial quantum computer 
(controlled by the quantum metalanguage of the subject himself) is a new kind of cyborg, called 
Quantum Cyborg (QC). The latter (see Zizzi, 2008) would allow a deeper integration between 
human mind and artificial devices. As the practical implementation of a QC requires to solve a 
number of difficult problems, such as the one of avoiding decoherence induced by external 
environment, in the final part of this paper we will shortly outline some possible strategies for 
coping with these difficulties. 
 
2. The conceptual problems underlying BCI design 
The design of a BCI requires the solution of a number of hard problems: 
 1) Knowing what features of brain signals are associated to specific kinds of intentions or of mental 
states. 
 2) Selecting the best techniques to detect these features in presence or noise and artefacts. 
 3) Finding the best way to implement online the sequence detection-action performance.  
So far these problems have been dealt with by resorting, on one hand, to experiments on human 
subjects which imagine to perform a given action, and, on the other hand, to soft computing 
algorithms, like the ones allowing artificial neural networks to learn, relying only on examples, to 
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mimic whatever kind of input-output relationship (see, in this regard, Bishop, 1995; Rojas, 1996; 
Bartlett and Anthony, 1999). 
This strategy, of course, is based on the hypothesis that mental states are fully characterized by 
specific activation patterns of brain neurons, where the attribute ‘specific’ is to be understood in a 
functional sense. This means that, while the same mental state is not necessarily associated to the 
activation of the same brain neurons, what matters is that, whatever be the neurons activated, each 
time, in correspondence to this state, they give rise to the same input-output behavioural patterns of 
the subject lying in this mental state itself.  
Within this functionalist framework the problem arising from the fact that the same mental state is, 
each time, associated to different patterns of neural activation is avoided by supposing that all these 
different patterns are characterized, if associated to the same mental state, by a sort of invariant 
“signature”. The latter can be conceived as defined by a set of invariant features characterizing 
these patterns, and whence also the electromagnetic signals emitted by the brain and detected, for 
instance, through electroencephalograms (EEG). These features, in principle, could be found 
through a suitable analysis of the observed EEG. However, as this analysis should, with high 
probability, be very difficult to implement, the best strategy seems to be the one of collecting the 
highest number possible of associations between EEG signals and motor outputs, so as to train, 
through a supervised learning procedure based on known examples, an artificial neural network to 
produce the output only when the presented EEG corresponds to the intention. Thus, if the learning 
would be successful, the network weight distribution found after the completion of learning itself, 
would automatically give an implicit description of the procedure to be used to analyze the EEG 
signal to extract the ‘signature’ of  the intention. 
Without entering into technical details about the implementation of this strategy, widely used to 
design the actual BCI, we will limit ourselves to remark that it is, in principle, destined to fail, 
owing to the existence of two main conceptual difficulties. The first one stems from the fact that, 
given a whatever supervised learning procedure, its performance in the test phase (that is, after 
completing the initial training phase) depends in a crucial way on the training examples used during 
the learning. Namely, not only their number must be high enough, but we also need that they are 
representative of the possible kinds of situations occurring within the whole sample from which 
training examples themselves have been extracted. Unfortunately, both conditions will never be 
satisfied in the case of EEG signals (or of whatever other kind of brain signal), first because the 
number of available data is severely limited (for practical reasons connected to the way through 
which experiments on human subjects are performed), and, in the second place, because we do not 
know (and we will never know) how the whole sample of possible EEG is structured. The latter 
circumstance precludes any possibility of assessing the representatives of chosen training examples, 
so that, for every supervised learning procedure, we will always be unable to grant its reliability. 
However, even if this difficulty could be avoided, we could never overcome the second main 
conceptual difficulty, arising from the fact that, in principle, mental states cannot be defined only in 
terms of input-output associations. The number of different possible input-output relationships 
associated to the intention is virtually unlimited, just because the number of different possible 
contexts is unlimited. We stress here that the word ‘context’ includes not only states of the 
environment, but also the occurrence of other, contemporarily present, mental states. To conclude 
this section, the previous arguments show that the actual strategy used to design BCI is unsuited to 
capture the occurrence of intentional states in the minds of subjects. This means that the main goal 
underlying the introduction of BCI will never be reached in this way. In the next sections we will 
explore a possible alternative. 
 
3.  Metathought 
Before going further, we remark that intentions can be hardly conceived as mental states. Namely 
the concept itself of mental state is useless when dealing with adaptive mechanisms, such as 
intentions, which underlie a number of control processes, in turn acting on mental operations, such 
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as reasoning, deciding, recalling, and the like. If we generically denote the whole set of usual 
mental operations through the word ‘thought’, we should denote intentions, and other control 
mechanisms, through the word ‘metathought’, to stress the fact the latter acts on, controls, and 
drives the ordinary thought. 
Within the history of Psychology the concept of metathought has not been very popular. In the 
Seventies Flavell introduced an analogous concept under the name ‘metacognition’ (Flavell, 1976). 
The study of these kinds of topics has been pursued mostly within the domain of Developmental 
and Educational Psychology (see, for instance, Weinert and Kluwe. 1987; Crowley et al., 1997). 
Only in more recent times some authors began to introduce computational models of the operation 
of prefrontal cortex, considered as the seat of control processes within the brain (Becker and Lim, 
2003). Anyway, all metathought processes could be interpreted as aiming to keep some sort of 
equilibrium or, more in general, of coherence. Therefore, in order to describe metathought and 
intentions, the problem is to find what are the best models, as regards both the physical basis of 
these processes and their logical nature. 
Of course, the generally adopted solution of this problem consists in resorting to classical physics 
and to classical logic. Unfortunately both are ruled out by theoretical arguments as well as 
experimental findings. On the theoretical side, we know from long time that classical physics is not 
endowed with coherence-keeping mechanisms. The latter are forbidden by Second Principle of 
Thermodynamics or, what is equivalent, by the so-called Correlation Weakening Principle, stating 
that whatever long range correlation will die away after a long enough evolution time. On the 
experimental side, a large number of experiments performed by psychologists evidenced that most 
mental processes, including semantic memory search, problem solving, reasoning, cannot be 
described by classical logic, which, rather, appears to be more suited to describe the operations 
performed on bits within a digital computer (see Adler and Rips, 2008). 
On the contrary, Quantum Theory appears as endowed with powerful coherence-keeping 
mechanisms, whose efficiency is, in rough terms, due to the fact that within it whatever entity is not 
spatially and temporally localized but rather described by a probability distribution ranging over the 
whole space-time. Thus, the superposition of different probability distributions associated to 
different entities gives rise to a sort of long range correlation between these latter which counteracts 
the disturbing influences produced by heat, noise, and other coherence-destroying mechanisms. 
Among the coherence phenomena of quantum nature we can quote ferromagnetism, super fluidity, 
laser effect, superconductivity, and many others. Some of the latter occur only below a very low 
critical temperature, close to the absolute zero, but others take place even at high temperature. 
It is, however, to be remembered that the expression ‘Quantum Theory’ is too generic. Namely we 
currently have two different kinds of Quantum Theories: Quantum Mechanics (QM), dealing with 
fixed numbers of particles lying within finite space volumes, and Quantum Field Theory (QFT), in 
which the field strengths are the basic entities, and infinite volumes as well as processes of creation 
and destruction of particles are possible. While in QM we have a finite number of degrees of 
freedom, QFT is characterized by an infinite (and continuous) number of degrees of freedom. Both 
in QM and in QFT the mathematical entities describing physical quantities must fulfil suitable 
constraints, expressing the non-classical nature of these theories and often called canonical 
commutation relations (CCR). Once given a physical system, a particular choice of the description 
of its dynamics, provided it fulfils the CCR, is called a representation of the CCR. Now an 
important theorem of QM, proved many years ago by Von Neumann, states that within it all 
different representations of the same physical system are unitarily equivalent. This means that in 
QM all representations of a given physical system have the same physical content. However, this no 
longer true in QFT, as shown already in the Sixties. This circumstance entails that within the latter 
theory the different descriptions of the same physical system can be unitarily non-equivalent, that is 
describing different kinds of physics. Such a state of affairs occur just when we deal with phase 
transitions, when a given physical system can undergo a transformation from a given phase (for 
instance solid) to another phase (for instance liquid), the two phases being characterized by entirely 
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different physical properties. This implies that only QFT offers a framework for describing phase 
transitions (see on these topics Minati and Pessa, 2006, Chap. 5; Pessa, 2008). 
These considerations entail that only QFT can describe the emergence of metathought. Such a 
circumstance is at the basis of a number of Quantum Brain Theories (see, for comprehensive 
overviews, Jibu and Yasue, 1995; Vitiello, 2001; Globus et al., 2004), in turn relying on a firm 
experimental evidence about the quantum nature of physical phenomena underlying mental 
processes (Tuszyński, 2006; Abbott et al., 2008). We cannot, however, forget that the same 
evidence leads us to conclude that normal thought processes should be described by QM, the theory 
to which QFT is reduced when we are far from phase transitions and the number of components of 
our systems is kept constant. The quantum logic of mind [Zizzi, PhD thesis] describes a Quantum 
Computation acting on qubits, entities consisting in a superposition of two quantum states, 
conventionally denoted as ‘0’ and ‘1’. Each qubit can be seen as carrying a sort of implicit double 
potentiality, which can give rise to an ordinary bit under the action of a projection operator 
producing a collapse of the qubit state. Thus the normal operation of human mind, in a number of 
cases, can be viewed as equivalent to the one of a suitable Quantum Computer manipulating qubits. 
 
4. Quantum Robots 
The previous considerations lead in a natural way to the introduction of the concept of Quantum 
Robot (QR). The latter, first proposed by Benioff (cfr. Benioff, 1998), can be defined as a mobile 
system which has a quantum computer on board, and any needed ancillary systems. A QR moves in 
and interacts with the environment of a quantum system. However, the QR originally discussed by 
Benioff have no awareness of their environment, and do not make decisions or measurements. We 
can therefore ask ourselves whether in the future it might be that quantum robots will be aware of 
the environment, and could perform experiments. This means that they might even become self-
aware, conscious, and have “free will”. 
In this regard it is to be taken into account that, in order to endow a QR with these features, it 
should be equipped with a sort of “internal observer” able both to look at the internal (quantum) 
computations of the QR itself and to control them. This internal observer thus should act on QR 
computations through a Quantum Metalanguage suited to control a Quantum Language, expressed 
in terms of qubit manipulations. It is natural to suppose that the core of the Quantum Metalanguage 
consists of inner measurement operators, like the ones used in QM. Unfortunately the latter are not 
suited to control a QR, as they coincide with projection operators, destroying qubits (which, after 
the action of a projector, become simple classical bits, whose value is 0 or 1). This entails that 
traditional “Quantum Logic” would not correctly describe the inner measurements needed by a QR 
(Zizzi, 2007). 
A possible way out of this problem consists in resorting to the so-called “Weak Measurements” 
(WM), yet introduced by Aharonov et al. (see Aharonov et al., 1988). Without entering here into 
technical details, we will limit ourselves to mention that a WM is based on a measuring apparatus 
which interacts very weakly with the quantum system to be measured so as to introduce in it only a 
negligible perturbation. Moreover, after the interaction with the measure apparatus, the latter acts in 
such a way as to measure (this time in a projective way), not the physical quantity which is the goal 
of the measure itself, but another different physical quantity, characterizing the system’s 
environment. The result of the latter measure, however, allows to guess the searched value of the 
physical quantity characterizing the system under study, value which was the true goal of the 
measurement procedure. A conceptual analysis, which will not be reported here (see Zizzi, 2005; 
2006), leads to represent WM through non-hermitian operators, whose eigenvalues (the values of 
the measured quantities) are given, in general, by complex numbers, with a real and an imaginary 
part. These operators can be interpreted as describing a quantum system interacting with a 
dissipative environment (see Vitiello, 2001; Pessa, 2008). In this regard we recall that the physical 
processes occurring within the brain should be dealt with, at least as concerns quantum aspects, 
through a Dissipative QFT, in absence of which the brain dynamics would be characterized by only 
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a single ground state, rather that by the multiplicity of different ground states needed to 
accommodate the multitude of different memory states necessarily occurring within the brain. 
It is to be stressed that a control based on a Quantum Metalanguage made by non-hermitian 
operators solves in an easy way the problem of the decoherence of QR. The latter, as it is well 
known, is produced by the action of a thermal environment destroying the superpositions of 
quantum states. However, as the non-hermitian operators associated to WM describe an open 
system interacting with a dissipative environment (not coincident with the thermal one), we must 
take into account that the very existence of qubits results from an entanglement between the system 
and this environment. Thus, if the states of the dissipative environment are eigenstates of these 
operators (remember that WM act on the dissipative environment), every thermal perturbation 
acting on the system will be automatically counteracted by the entanglement of system’s eigenstates 
with the ones of dissipative environment, which will resist against any attempt to entangle the 
system itself with the thermal environment. 
All previous arguments points to an interesting possibility, the one of using the generalized coherent 
states (eigenstates of non-hermitian operators) of the brain to control a quantum system, for instance 
a quantum computer based on quantum dots. This would open the way to the implementation of a 
QC, in which a human subject, through the quantum metalanguage, could drive a QC, through a 
BCI much more powerful than the actually existing ones, and able to transform in a more effective 
way human intentions into actions. Such a kind of QC, opening the way to a deeper merging of 
humans and computers (possible owing to the quantum framework), would, however, require a lot 
of experiments, and conceptual as well as technological advances. While, in principle, nobody 
prevents from having a quantum robots, endowed with QFT-based aspects, able to perform inner 
WM on its own quantum operations, it seems more plausible that the only feasible implementation 
of a Quantum Metalanguage be the one based on human brain. 
  
5. Conclusions 
The previous arguments showed that the quantum approach predicts the possibility of a direct action 
of mind on matter. This circumstance, beyond the improvement of the operation of existing BCI, 
opens the possibility of designing new kinds of BCI interfaces. This could cause a revolutionary 
change in our actual way of thinking, based on the tacit assumption that our thoughts have no direct 
effects on the world.  
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